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1 Introduction 
Digital technology has, over the last two decades, led to a radical change in how we enjoy 
and create culture. The digitalisation of creative works and the development of devices 
with access to the Internet have made it possible for more than a third of the world’s popu-
lation1 to enjoy, learn and be inspired by the works of others and contribute to the global 
creative sphere with their own works. This vibrant environment has become a spring of 
creativity, where new creations, art forms and business models are welling up. While there 
has been a liberalisation of the enjoyment and making of creative works, such works have 
also become increasingly valuable to individuals, businesses and the society and held by 
some to be the “single most important factor driving growth”.2 Therefore, the protection of 
creative works has become correspondingly more important. For this purpose copyright 
law has been given an essential role.  
 
The question is whether copyright law in its present form is suited for this task. Digital 
technology and the Internet has not only given new opportunities, but also brought prob-
lems to the field of copyright. Copyright law, at its basic level, regulates the right to copy a 
certain work and historically the act of copying was complicated, expensive and time-
consuming. Therefore, it can be argued that copyright had its most important role in regu-
lating the rights and disputes between a limited number of people; namely, publishers who 
held the copyrights and other intermediaries who had the equipment and knowledge to 
copy.3 Digital technology changed this. Suddenly, perfect copies of digital creative content 
can be made by anyone at zero cost on any digital device, and the Internet enables world-
wide dissemination. This environment has, as noted above, many positive aspects but it is 
also results in a significant modern challenge that the current copyright regime seems una-
ble to address: the severe increase in copyright infringement. 
                                                
1 World Bank (2012).   
2 Elkin-Koren (2012) p.1. 
3 Schultz (2006) p.659, esp. fn.17, Griffin (2013) p.7. 
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Statistics show that copyright infringement causes great losses to the whole creative sector 
every year4. In 2011, 57% of the world’s computer users would admit infringement of 
software. The commercial value of this software theft increased from $58.8 billion (353 
mrd. NOK) in 2010 to $63 billion (378 mrd. NOK) in 2011, of which Western Europe5 
represents $13.8 billion (83 mrd. NOK).6 The turnover of the Norwegian record industry 
dropped 50% from 2001-2011.7 There were 7.3 million illegal downloads of content regis-
tered in Norway per week in 2012,8 similar to 1.5 illegal downloads per person. 
 
To protect their interests, the Content Industry9 attempted to fight the new wave of copy-
right infringement by “traditional methods”;10 initially through litigation and when this did 
not provide the desired effect, additional efforts were made in lobbying for change of law. 
Governments responded by expanding the scope of the copyright and by introducing new 
and easier enforcement procedures. However, this has not led to a significant reduction in 
the infringement of copyright law. A natural conclusion would be that copyright law is not 
fit for purpose and is not an efficient tool to address copyright infringement. However, it is 
arguably not the law per se, but the enforcement mechanisms that render copyright law 
deficient. If copyright law was adhered to, authors would be encouraged to create by hav-
ing their rights protected whilst the public would be able to access this creative content – 
                                                
4 Regarding the caution required when relying on these figures, see section 2. 
5 Twenty-two nations. 
6 Business Software Alliance (2012) p.9. 
7  IFPI Norge (2011) p.2. 
8 Norwaco (2013) p.15. 
9 For the purpose of this thesis, this term refers to business models in the creative sector mainly developed 
before the online digital revolution such as publishing houses, record labels, and film companies that more or 
less rely on copyright protection.  
10 The traditional methods by which the Content Industry attempted to protect its copyrights and the 
limitations inherent in this approach will be considered in detail in section 3.3.1.  
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which are among the main goals of copyright law.11 This thesis puts forward the argument 
that the crisis of copyright infringement can be tackled through an innovative and progres-
sive approach that culminates in the introduction of an online Digital Copyright Exchange 
(‘DCE’). The regulation of undesirable behaviour and enforcement of copyright law could 
be carried out without unduly restricting access to content by providing a preferable substi-
tute to copyright infringement. 
 
In the Hargreaves Report,12 which analysed how intellectual property law supports eco-
nomic growth, the concept of a DCE was outlined as an online marketplace where the trade 
of rights to use creative works would take place. Content would be accessible on a website 
through a network of interoperable databases and rightholders could make new content 
available for licensing on the platform.13 The idea is to make content and information re-
garding copyright ownership from all creative sectors available internationally. A DCE like 
this offers various benefits such as a drastic reduction in complexity and costs, more acces-
sibility and greater clarity, and therefore has the potential to address the infringement chal-
lenge without constraining the constant growth of opportunities. This thesis takes this ini-
tial concept of the DCE as described in the Hargreaves Report, puts flesh on the bones of 
the idea and suggests the ways in which an ambitious formulation of a DCE could tackle 
the current problem of copyright infringement.14 Part of the development of the concept of 
a DCE is the consideration of the function an Online Dispute Resolution service could 
have.15 Such as service, it is argued, would provide a quick and cheap method of resolving 
copyright disputes, as well as an option for negotiation during the formation of contracts 
for licences, and further add to the potential flexibility and usefulness of the DCE.     
 
                                                
11 MacQueen (2011) p.45, Rognstad (2009) p.34, see further section 3.3.1. 
12 Hargreaves (2011). 
13 Hargreaves (2011) para.4.31, 4.23. 
14 See section 4. 
15 See section 5. 
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Although the Hargreaves Report was initiated by the UK Prime Minister David Cameron 
due to the challenges facing the current copyright regime and hence the need for modernis-
ing the copyright framework in the UK, the concerns regarding copyright addressed in the 
Report are not limited to the UK. The same challenges, in particular infringement, are in-
deed apparent elsewhere.16 Norway will serve as an example of a country where the DCE 
arguably could be introduced with success.  
2 Methodology 
The UK proposal of the DCE is not focused on particular legal rules, but instead adopts an 
economic and technological perspective. For this reason, the approach of this thesis is to 
discuss the issues raised at a conceptual level. It is not a legal doctrinal analysis. The ad-
vantage of this approach is that it will make the solution more relevant for Norway. This 
can be justified by seeing the problem of copyright infringement as a social problem in 
both the UK and Norway which requires a holistic, rather than strictly legal, solution. The 
technological solutions considered are dealt with in the same manner. The thesis does not 
delve into technical details as this is beyond the author’s level of expertise.  
 
The sources used are a combination of peer-reviewed academic literature and so called 
‘grey’ literature. As the latter lacks the same quality checks as the former, it requires extra 
caution when evaluating its worth. However, consideration of these grey sources are neces-
sary due to the youth of the topic under discussion and the fact that these sources aid under-
standing of the subject matter. For the statistics used in this thesis, additional care is re-
quired. The available statistical material is based on different methods. The numbers could 
have been produced for strategic purposes such as influencing policy and the method cho-
sen can sometimes be linked to an ideologically, political or commercial bias.17 
                                                
16 See, for example, regarding the software industry: Business Software Alliance (2012). 
17 Bridy (2011) pp.695, 706-708, Mitra-Kahn (2011) p.76. 
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3 Copyright Infringement 
To provide context to the argument that the DCE can address copyright infringement chal-
lenges, this section will look at who are the infringers and why they infringe. We will first 
meet six imaginary actors in the creative field and see how they are interacting with crea-
tive content. I will then distil from these stories the main reasons why copyright is in-
fringed. Thereafter, I will discuss the traditional methods by which the Content Industry 
has attempted to tackle infringement. The disadvantages of these methods will be discussed 
and it will be suggested that a new approach needs to be taken to effectively combat the 
current infringement problem facing copyright law.    
3.1 Stories 
3.1.1 Story 1A 
Oline Aas is a law student with a passion for jazz music. Oline is painfully aware of copy-
right law and acknowledges that artists are struggling to get any return on what they create, 
but she cannot afford to pay full price for everything she wants to listen to. It is also diffi-
cult to find the recordings she wants on legal services. She has, however, been lucky to find 
an online file-sharing community specialising in jazz music where she downloads music 
regardless of copyright protection. When she discovers new music from unknown artists 
she really likes, she often purchases the music directly from the artist. 
3.1.2 Story 1B 
Lars Holm’s hobby is creating a digital library of creative content. He gathers everything 
he can find for free, from software to music and film. He is ideologically opposed to copy-
right and the constraining effect of copyright law on the public enjoyment of culture. He 
thinks everything should be available for free. Therefore, he is also eager to share his con-
tent on a several P2P networks. 
3.1.3 Story 2A 
As part of their studies, two psychology students Kristoffer Gjærde and Kari Festøy, pro-
duce a documentary film about personality assessment with focus on emotional reactions. 
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The first part of the film contained the theory behind such tests and an explanation of the 
application of this in practice. Thereafter came a self-assessment, where a series of famous 
and less known film clips, photographs and texts, followed by questions, allowed the view-
er to assess his or her personality. 
 
The film was a success and the professor in charge of the course wanted to use it for teach-
ing her classes. The two students were quite business-minded and they discovered that 
there was great demand for their film from other universities, psychology practitioners and 
individuals. Therefore, they set up a company, named MindStudy, and started selling their 
film. When they started searching for film clips for their second film – on introversion and 
extroversion - they realised that according to copyright law they were obliged to acquire 
licences for the use of the content used and that had sold a lot of copies of their first film 
without any copyright. As the making of the first film was part of their education, they did 
not require licences due to copyright exemptions for educational purposes and they had 
totally forgotten about this when turning the project commercial. 
 
It turned out to be difficult to get the licences required. Firstly, they had used many differ-
ent types of content, the rights of which were organised by different intermediaries and 
collecting societies, and, secondly, as the film was relevant to psychology in general, their 
market was international. Due to a complex structure of right management and with laws 
varying from country to country, getting all the necessary licences became too costly and 
time-consuming. Genuinely convinced that their idea could both help the progression of the 
study of psychology and the life of individuals - and be profitable as a bonus - they decided 
to risk it without all licences in place. 
3.1.4 Story 2B 
Marte Kirkerud worked as a freelance editor, mostly within health, beauty and celebrities 
for magazines such as Se og Hør, and Her og Nå. One day she got fed up with it all and 
quit her jobs. As she always kept a backup of her work, she now had a big database of in-
formation and images. This was the starting point of her new activity. Employing her edit-
ing and software skills, she manipulated photos and stories to show celebrities in embar-
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rassing or controversial situations, and her newly-started company used them to create 
slightly obscure advertising campaigns and web-sites. 
3.1.5 Story 3A 
Google launched their news aggregator service in 2002,18 which brings together news from 
a range of sources all around the world.19 Inspired by this a new company, MyNews, 
planned a similar service, focusing on personalised news aggregation. The personalisation 
feature would be based on choices made by the user and/or the service’s ‘intelligent’ ability 
to monitor the user’s electronic actions - such as email and social media - and supply news 
based on this. This type of news aggregation is automatically carried out by computers and 
the feed could be updated continuously. It is difficult to acquire licences for the aggregated 
news which may be copyright protected as at present there is no service offering automatic 
licensing. The company was aware of the on-going debate on whether this kind of news 
aggregation is in accordance with copyright law; there being decisions against similar 
companies20 and countries like Germany and France have adopted new legislation to con-
straint the practice.21 However, Google was still offering the service and they were willing 
to try the same. The way Google kept their service going in Germany was to make the 
German news sources actively accept the use of their online content.22 What MyNews un-
derestimated was the importance the powerful position Google had in comparison to them-
selves. Therefore, they did not get the desired acceptance from any news source when try-
                                                
18 Martínez (2012) p.114. 
19 Google (2011). 
20 See, for example, ECJ C-5/08 Infopaq International A/S v. Danske Dagblades Forening p.465 
a preliminary ruling followed by Danish Case 97/2007 where it was ruled that 11 words could be subject of 
copyright. In the Belgian Case 2007/AR/1730 Copiepresse v. Google, the news aggregated by Google News 
was found to infringe copyright. However, due to loss in audience by not being searchable on Google, Copie-
presse and Google later entered into a settlement, see Copiepresse (2012). Yet, traditionally compilation and 
reuse of news have been allowed by copyright law, see e.g. Berne Convention Art.2(8). 
21 Podszun (2013) p.260. 
22 Brombach (2013), Rabenstein (2013). 
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ing to launch in Germany and in other countries they were running the risk of being sued, 
without the financial security of Google. 
3.1.6 Story 3B 
Peder Bakke and Hans Moe set up a website for sharing of digital content and making prof-
it through advertisement and subscriptions which they called PirateFjord. They did not care 
about whether the content shared on their website was illegally uploaded. They simply con-
sidered the website as a good business opportunity. 
3.2 Identifying Copyright Infringers 
From the above stories, three main groups of online copyright infringers can be identified. 
These groups are not exhaustive, but are chosen because they show the main characteristics 
of the majority of copyright infringers.23 In addition, the groups are not fixed entities, as the 
members of the groups often move from one to another, for example when a consumer 
downloads a copyright protected work (group 1), subsequently edits this work and makes it 
available for others online (group 2).24 Furthermore, the stories above show one ‘good guy’ 
and one ‘bad guy’ from each group, which helps to visualise the parameters of the DCE. 
Finally, it can be noted that although the impact of the infringement problem can vary from 
sector to sector (film, music, software, etc.), the basic reasons behind the infringement 
would in broad terms appear to be similar and this makes it practical to consider the situa-
tion as a whole.   
3.2.1 Group 1: The Consumer 
Consumers of creative content infringe copyrighted content for their own use, rather than 
for the purpose of resale. They would typically be individuals illegally downloading e.g. 
music or software from a file-sharing service like the PirateBay25 for their own use, or it 
                                                
23 These groups are inspired by the list of the 5 players involved in copyright licensing in Hooper (2012, 
March) pp.11-12. 
24 This corresponds with the ‘situated user’ in Cohen (2005) p.349 et seq. 
25 www.piratebay.sx (the domain is changing all the time due to suspensions, see Ernesto (2013)). 
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could be a shop-keeper wanting to play music for customers. Some consumers would regu-
larly upload or share content, intentionally or unintentionally, but if too extensively they 
may qualify for group 3, the distributor. Both Oline and Lars from the stories above are 
stereotypical examples. 
  
So, why do consumers infringe copyright? A survey carried out in four waves from 2012 to 
2013 by Ofcom26 on online consumer copyright infringement in the UK shows what users 
themselves report as the reasons for infringing and what factors would encourage them to 
stop.27 Although these findings are from the UK, by viewing copyright infringement as a 
common societal problem in both countries, in could be argued that the attitudes of con-
sumers to copyright infringement are similar between Norway and the UK on these 
points.28 Two tables in the Ofcom survey identify 18 “[r]easons for infringing”, 17 
“[f]actors that would encourage infringers to stop” and the importance in percentages for 
the infringers29. I place these reasons within 5 main categories which can influence con-
sumer positively or negatively. These reasons relate to price of content, accessibility of 
content (e.g. convenience, speed, availability), risk, ideology and lack of clarity of law. 
 
The reasons identified in the survey are also identified as important factors in academic 
literature. Adopting Becker’s approach that committing an offence is a result of a rational 
person’s choice, 30 the first three categories can be analysed as part of the balancing of costs 
against benefits that takes place when a consumer considers whether or not to infringe cop-
                                                
26 The independent regulator and competition authority for the UK communications industries.  
27 See Ofcom High Volume (2013) p.90. A survey on unlawful behaviour such as this may suffer from 
dishonesty even though measures were taken to avoid this, see Ofcom Wave 4 (2013) p.10. However, it is 
plausable that dishonesty is likely to affect questions about whether a person has infringed or not, rather than 
the reasons given for infringing – which are the most important for this thesis. 
28 This is confirmed by a similar, less detailed, survey from Norway, see Gran (2012) pp.53-55.  
29 Ofcom High Volume (2013) p.90.  
30 Becker (1968) pp.176-179. See further on the relation between costs and benefits expressed as ‘consumers’ 
willingness to pay’ for digital content in Chiang (2009). 
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yright. It can be argued that in the consumer’s mind, the perception of risk - typically of 
legal sanctions, but also social condemnation, malware etc. - is compared with the benefits 
of infringement, for example, low price and high accessibility. This argument correlates 
with the Ofcom survey results, showing that low price is important and the perception of 
risk of sanctions is low, and is supported by Belleflamme and Peitz.31 These writers also, 
however, ask why consumers are not, to the same extent, breaking laws other than copy-
right law where the allocation of costs and benefits are similar. They answer this question 
by referring to Balestrino’s model showing that the lack of perceived social costs, which is 
a part of the consumer’s perception of risk, leads to no social condemnation.32 In the story 
of Oline, she does not feel judged by her friends and many of them are part of the same file 
sharing community. They have been notified that one of the members from the US has re-
ceived copyright infringement warnings, but that felt remote and unlikely to happen to 
them. A similar explanation, but from the point of view of the potential infringer, is offered 
by Hill’s application of Jones’ ‘moral intensity’ argument, which shows that the moral in-
tensity of committing copyright infringement is low compared to other crimes and there-
fore the rates are high.33 It can, however, be suggested that both social condemnation and 
the moral intensity is increasing with the growing awareness of copyright law in society. 
This is also consistent with the increase in use of legal services34 such as Spotify and Net-
flix.  
 
Furthermore, according to Hill, some of the reasons for infringement can be explained by 
equity theory, which “describes an individual’s search for fairness or equity in social ex-
changes”.35 Both the perceived value of content relative to price and feelings of inequality 
                                                
31 Belleflamme (2010) p.4. 
32 Balestrino (2008) pp.455, 466. See also Schultz (2006) p.654 and Mandel (2013) who in his study 
demonstrates that “views of what intellectual property rights should be [differs] substantially from actual 
law” (in abstract). 
33 Hill (2007) pp.12-13, referring to Jones (1991). 
34 Chiang (2009) p.2.  
35 Hill (2007) p.12. 
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are identified.36 This correlates well with reported reasons in the Ofcom survey such as 
“The industry makes too much money” and “I think legal content is too expensive”.37 The 
equity theory can therefore relate to the above-mentioned categories of price and ideology. 
In the story about Oline, a fairness argument can be spotted by the fact that she often pur-
chases content subsequent to her infringing: she thinks the latter purchase balances out the 
wrongdoing. Lars is of the opinion that copyright law is unfair and therefore his actions are 
justifiable, especially when he supplies the rest of the society with free content.  
 
The final category - lack of clarity of the laws - is supported by Belleflamme. He suggests 
that, in particular, limitations to the exclusive rights of the copyright owner, such as ‘fair 
use’ or ‘private copy/private use’, are difficult to apply in the online world and consumers 
do not understand what is legal.38 For the consumers a similar reason relating to another 
stage of the content transaction could, however, encourage infringers to stop - that is if it is 
clearer what available content complies with copyright laws and what content is only avail-
able due to illegality.39 Hence, instead of having to consider the law themselves, the con-
sumers want someone else to consider the law, so that it is easy to get hold of legal content.  
 
As discussed in section 4 onwards, the DCE could offer solutions that would mitigate these 
reasons for infringement so that the ‘good guy’, such as Oline, does not find it beneficial or 
justifiable to infringe. However, for the ‘bad guy’, the idealistic or criminally motivated 
infringer such as Lars, the DCE - which is voluntary based - cannot offer a direct solution. 
However, the DCE could lessen demand for illegal services in general, which in turn would 
cause fewer possibilities for infringement for anyone.  
 
                                                
36 Hill (2007) p.12. 
37 Ofcom High Value (2013) p.90. 
38 Belleflamme (2010) p.3. 
39 Ofcom High Value (2013) p.90. 
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The reasons identified in the consumer group also apply to the two further groups consid-
ered below. In the following sections, for the re-users and distributors the additional rea-
sons specific to the particular group are discussed.  
3.2.2 Group 2: The Re-user  
This group consists of those who are unauthorised and are using copyrighted works to cre-
ate something new. Included here are artistic expressions made possible by digital technol-
ogy and the Internet, such as mashups and remixes,40 along with more traditional expres-
sions like the film by MindStudy in the story above and the manipulated pictures by Marte 
Kirkerud. This group got an enormous boost of members with the introduction of the Web 
2.0, where users were encouraged to “engage, create, and share content online” on sites 
such as Facebook, YouTube, etc.41 This is not to say that all user generated content 
(‘UGC’) infringes copyright, but it is unlikely that a Facebook user acquires a licence be-
fore modifying and sharing a picture found on the web. 
 
While the focus in the consumer group was on accessing and acquiring digital content, the 
infringers of this group have already got the content (legally or illegally), and are making it 
public in a way that constitutes copyright infringement. As the content here would be sub-
ject to use in a new context with or without alteration, a licence for re-using purposes 
would be different to that of a consumer. The story about MindStudy shows that a simple 
business plan can involve complexity in obtaining licences. However, as complexity repre-
sents high cost and time consumption, infringement could still partly be explained by a cost 
and benefit analysis.  
 
Furthermore, the psychological explanations for consumer infringement are also applicable 
to this group, as re-use of content has become normal and acceptable. Related to this is 
Lee’s argument that “uncertainty in formal copyright law can lead to the phenomenon of 
                                                
40 O'Brien (2006).  
41 Lee (2008) pp.1460-1461. 
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“warming,” in which - unlike chilling - users are emboldened to make unauthorized uses of 
copyrighted works based on seeing what appears to be an increasingly accepted practice”,42 
which is the other side of the coin to lack of social stigma.43 Re-users choose to do what the 
other re-users do and what the online UGC platforms encourages them to do. 
 
As for the ‘good guy’ consumer, the DCE could offer solutions for the ‘good guy’ re-user 
to alleviate the reasons for infringement, particularly regarding complexity.44 For the ‘bad 
guy’ re-user infringing copyright the DCE’s role would be the same as described about the 
‘bad guy’ in section 3.2.1. Regarding the ‘bad guy’ infringing moral rights, such as Marte 
Kirkerud above, the DCE could have a further role. Provided that the rights to use the con-
tent were acquired through the DCE, the existence of an ODR service could provide a 
method to resolve the moral rights dispute.45 
3.2.3 Group 3: The Distributor 
The distributor copies and redistributes content in its original form in order to gain eco-
nomical profit.46 Without authorisation this can constitute copyright infringement. The 
‘good guys’ of this group are valuable for the society as they bring forward new ways of 
enjoying culture and enhance access to cultural content. Such businesses are not based on 
copyright infringement. However, as shown by the story of MyNews, it can be challenging 
for start-up businesses to comply with copyright, whether due to lack of clarity in the law 
or the complexity and expense of obtaining the appropriate licences, so they end up infring-
ing copyright.  
 
The ‘bad guys’ of this group are businesses based entirely on copyright infringement. Only 
looking at online activity, a recent study of websites considered to be infringing copyright 
                                                
42 Lee (2008) p.1459. 
43 See section 3.2.1. 
44 Section 4.3.2. 
45 Sections 4.2.5, 5.2.3. 
46 Lessig (2004) p.62.  
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identified six business models based on copyright infringement, including P2P services and 
websites providing access to unauthorised content through pay-to-enter schemes.47 The 
street sale of fake DVDs and other manifestations of creative content, which is a typical 
sight in some countries, is also often based on online copyright infringement. These busi-
nesses are either “in it for the money”48 or for ideological reasons.49 In the story above, 
Peder and Hans combine these reasons. These copyright infringers are not going to start 
using the DCE, as copyright infringement is the basis for the businesses. However, again 
the DCE could significantly reduce the demand for illegal services, thereby reducing the 
market, hence render the business model unviable.  
3.3 Tackling Copyright Infringement 
Following from the above section that outlined the different types of copyright infringers, 
this section will consider possible approaches and ways to tackle the infringement problem. 
I identify three approaches: i) the traditional, ii) alternative business models and iii) the 
holistic.50 There are several disadvantages with the traditional approach and new business 
models cannot be adopted by all. It is therefore suggested we need a new holistic approach 
to efficiently tackle the infringement problem and at the same time ensure unimpeded crea-
tivity and access to culture. 
3.3.1 The Traditional Approach 
The traditional approach, which refers to how the Content Industry has attempted to ad-
dress online copyright infringement so far, has mostly relied on three strategies: firstly, 
conventional litigation, secondly, graduated response laws and thirdly, preventive 
measures. The Industry has also lobbied for stricter copyright regulation by making the 
scope of the copyright laws wider and enforcement easier.  
                                                
47 PRS for Music (2012) p.5. 
48 Schultz (2006) p.659, Belleflamme (2010) p.3. 
49 PirateBay claims to be a non-profit ideological service http://piratebayblog.wordpress.com/our-ideology/ 
and https://thepiratebay.se/about.   
50 Similar approaches are identified by Stranieri (2001) pp.111-113. 
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Conventional private litigation has involved suing thousands of individuals for uploading 
files onto file-sharing services, arguably trying to deter by spreading fear51 and the Record-
ing Industry Association of America represents an example of such a method.52 Enforce-
ment against a large number of infringers over a vast area did, however, prove burdensome 
and inefficient.53 Another method has been litigation directed towards Internet intermediar-
ies providing file-sharing platforms,54 also without the desired effect.55  
 
As these methods did not seem to be working, the Content Industry lobbied for graduated 
response laws,56 to which many Governments have responded.57 This method differs from 
the conventional litigation above by shifting some responsibility from the rightholders to an 
administrative authority and/or Internet Service Providers (ISP) to make it easier to reach 
individual infringers.58 Rightholders are, due to privacy rights, usually prevented from ob-
                                                
51 Swartout (2011) p.500. 
52 Karunaratne (2012) pp.286-288. 
53 Swartout (2011) p.500. The Recording Industry Association of America (‘RIAA’) from 2003 to 2006 sued 
over 17,000 individuals, see RIAA Watch (2006), but still an estimate of 1.3 billion music files were illegally 
downloaded by US students in 2006, Brittain (2007). See also Electronic Frontier Foundation (2008). 
54 Swartout (2011) p.500. See, for example, UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com (US, 2000), A&M Records, 
Inc. v. Napster, Inc. (US, 2001); MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., (US, 2005); Swedish Case B 13301-06 
(Pirate Bay, 2009); Dramatico Entertainment Limited & Ors v. British Sky Broadcasting Limited & Ors (UK, 
2012). 
55 For example, the early case of A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. (US, 2001) did not stop the explosion of 
infringement, the cases against The PirateBay in Sweden (Case B 13301-06) lead to a huge fine and jail 
sentence for four founders, but the site is still running. Due to Electronic Frontier Foundation (2008), new 
alternative file sharing platforms quickly pop up after others shut down or agree to filtering content, and the 
numbers of file sharing did not drop after shut downs. 
56 Swartout (2011) p.509. 
57 De Beer (2009) pp.389-391, Anderson (2008). 
58 De Beer (2009) pp.389-391. 
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taining the identity of copyright infringers from the ISP without a court order.59 Under the 
graduated response system the intermediaries, or the authority, and not the rightholders, 
contact and warn the alleged infringers. Commonly, two warnings are sent to the infringer 
before the case can be taken to court where possible punishments could be fines, suspen-
sion of Internet access, or termination of Internet account.60 In order to claim damages, 
however, the rightholder would have to proceed through a civil court action.61  
 
Unlike other traditional methods, the graduated response approach can result in a decrease 
in copyright infringement.62 Another advantage compared to the others is the educational 
aspect of warnings, which gives the infringers the chance to change behaviour before any 
court action. Nevertheless, despite the ostensible effect of the graduated response, the de-
scribed methods all together have not been particularly successful. Recalling section 3.2.1 
on reasons for why people infringe this is not surprising: the perceptible risk is not high 
enough to overcome the benefits. A better result could have been achieved if the Content 
Industry and the lawmakers managed to establish social condemnation of copyright in-
fringement (also a risk for the individual infringer),63 and not only focused on creating a 
risk of punishment. As argued by Schulz, it requires a lot to change peoples’ behaviour by 
the use of deterrence-based strategies when the law does not correspond with the social 
norm.64  
 
To consider graduated response in particular there are further, more fundamental, objec-
tions to this approach. Firstly, suspension of Internet access, which was perhaps the most 
effective aspect of this approach and increased the perceived risk for the infringer, could be 
                                                
59 This is e.g. the case in Norway Åndsverksloven § 56b, Sweden, Finland, Netherlands, see Prop. 65 L 
(2012-2013) pp.11-13. 
60 Swartout (2011) p.499, Hadopi (2010). 
61 Werkers (2011). 
62 Meyer (2012) p.117. 
63 See section 3.2.1. 
64 Schultz (2006) p.663. 
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considered as a breach of the human right of freedom of expression.65 Secondly, revealing 
Internet users’ identity without the involvement of an independent judiciary could be in 
opposition with both individuals’ privacy rights and the general rule of law.66 It is perhaps 
not surprising that France, a pioneer on the graduated response law, recently decided to 
relax their law.67 
 
The recently amended Norwegian Copyright Act68 is similar, yet not as severe, as the 
French system. The law makes it easier to identify copyright infringing internet subscribers 
by enabling the court to order ISPs to disclose to rightholders personal information related 
to IP-addresses which they can then use to send warning letters or begin court proceedings. 
Such information was previously only accessible by a licensed authority.69 The court has 
also been granted the power to block infringing web-sites. 70 However, Norway has ad-
dressed some of the ideological objections because penalising infringers by restricting In-
ternet access as in France was considered inappropriate and was not advised.71 Yet this may 
have the side-effect that the law will be less effective than its French counterpart.  
 
The traditional approach also encompasses a preventive strategy. The Content Industry has 
sought to protect content by Digital Rights Management72 (‘DRM’) - employing technolog-
ical measures to restrict copying. This approach was also supported by active lobbying 
which resulted in the wide adoption of laws prohibiting the circumvention of technical 
                                                
65 Lucchi (2011) pp.675-676.  
66 Lucchi (2011) p.667. 
67 WIPR (2013), Ministère de la Culture et de la Communication (2013). 
68 Åndsverksloven kap.7a. 
69 Prop.65 L (2012-2013) p.5. 
70 Åndsverksloven §56c. 
71 Prop.65 L (2012-2013) p.9. 
72 Al-Rafee (2006) p.238. 
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copy-restriction methods.73 Despite the law, mass circumvention of DRM has rendered this 
approach unsuccessful. 
 
With this background, it is clear from a practical standpoint that the traditional approach as 
a whole has not been effective in addressing the copyright infringement problem. However, 
there are also more ideological objections. The traditional methods have as their aim the 
restriction of content and this can have a detrimental effect on creativity. It is the position 
of this thesis that copyright infringement can be addressed without constraining creativity. 
 
Critics from, for example, The free culture movement,74 and Communia75 have pointed out 
that the continuously stricter regulation of cultural content is a constraint on our cultural 
life and the opportunities for creation and innovation.76 This is an obvious effect of the pre-
ventive strategy where the Content Industry has ‘physically’ restricted forms of use. Should 
not culture be a part of the common goods of mankind instead of being a privilege granted 
to a few by the law? Rightly, exemptions have been made, for example, for non-
commercial private use and educational use, but is this enough? Creation and innovation 
needs nutrition. Creators need ‘free'77 access to as much cultural expression and as many 
creative works as possible for further creation.78 For this reason some acts of infringement 
can, to a certain extent, be justified.79  
 
                                                
73 Initiated by WIPO Copyright Treaty Art.11, followed by e.g. Digital Millennium Copyright Act and 
Directive 2001/29/EC. 
74 Lawrence Lessig with for example Free Culture, 2004, and his establishment of Creative Commons, 
drawing on ideas from Richard M. Stallmann (founder of the free software movement), see e.g. Stallman 
(2002), and Stallmann (1983). 
75 de Rosnay (2012) p.xi-xiii. 
76 Lessig (2004) pp.8-10. 
77 Not as in free beer, Lessig (2006a). 
78 Elkin-Koren (2012) p.164. 
79 Lessig (2004) pp.62-79. 
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However, all infringement cannot continue. According to the socio-economic justification 
of copyright,80 public access to work as inspiration for creating new works is not enough to 
encourage creation.81 The creator also needs an incentive to create.82 The creation of a 
work can be expensive while the illegal copying of a digital work, or a digital version of it, 
is practically free. The free culture movement also agrees that balancing these two objec-
tives is important.83 The question is therefore not whether to protect the values behind the 
privilege conferred by copyright law or not, it is how to do this.  
3.3.2 Alternative Business Models   
One alternative, and extreme way, of addressing copyright infringement is to make copy-
right practically irrelevant by creating business models where the authors’ returns do not 
rely on copyright.84 One currently very profitable85 business model is the development of 
computer and smart-phone games based on advertising, sales of in-game assets and extra 
levels. An example is browser games on Facebook such as FarmVille. Playing the game is 
free and money is made from selling equipment inside the game.86 Another type of busi-
ness model is games that require online subscription in order to be attractive for the play-
ers.87 The computer game World of Warcraft is an example where playing with friends 
online makes the game what it is.88 A third business model is the development and sale of 
games as part of marketing campaigns or TV channels.89 The narrow focus of these games 
                                                
80 There are other possible justifications for copyright and it is difficult to empirically prove or disprove this 
socio-economic justification, see Rognstad (2009) pp.31-34.  
81 Landes (1989) pp.332-333, as referred in Rognstad (2009) p.33. 
82 Rognstad (2009) pp.32-33. 
83 Lessig (2004) preface by David Pogue. 
84 An idea put forward by Stallman (1994). This section and the examples are generally inspired by Edwards 
(2013). 
85 Kirman (2011) p.18. 
86 For a simple explanation of the business model, see Zichermann (2012).  
87 Doke (2013). 
88 Battle, M. 
89  E.g. Kelloggs: http://www.clubkelloggs.ca/games/building-with-the-bars/.  
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makes them an unattractive target for copyright infringement. A final example of business 
models is artists and musicians that make their money primarily through performances. A 
performance can be recorded, but the experience of being there can never be copied. In 
these examples copyright loses its importance.90 
 
Although this approach works well for some authors, it does not suit everyone. How would 
for example a composer who for some reason is not interested in performing get income 
from her music? Telling her to tailor all the music to for example political parties or shop-
ping malls would indeed be limiting, or to suggest including advertisement jingles as a part 
of the music would be rather strange as well. Therefore copyright infringement cannot 
simply be ignored, it must be dealt with in some way.   
3.3.3 A Holistic Approach 
As neither the traditional approach nor the innovative approach are sufficiently effective in 
addressing the copyright infringement problem, it is suggested that a more holistic ap-
proach should be taken. As argued by Lessig,91 regulation of human behaviour is complex 
and consists of more than what can be enforced in the courts. There are four modes: archi-
tecture, the market, norms as well as law, and these all play important roles in affecting and 
controlling behaviour. This can be illustrated with an example. Drunk driving is usually 
regulated by law and penalties, social stigma and information campaigns, and by the price 
and availability of alcohol. Another way may be to install alcolocks in all cars, thereby 
changing the architecture. 
 
In terms of modes of regulation the approaches described above are limited. The deterrence 
strategy is mainly using the mode of law, whiles the preventive strategy is a mix of archi-
tecture and law. The approach making copyright irrelevant has showed good results by 
                                                
90 Edwards (2013). 
91 Lessig (1999) and Lessig (2006) Ch.7. For application of these ideas, see, e.g, Stranieri (2001), Dusollier 
(2012), Williams (2007) p.77, Rátai (2005).  
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using the modes of market and architecture in combination, but only for a limited group of 
authors. By contrast, a holistic approach where a combination of all the modes of regula-
tion are used would arguably be more effective in addressing copyright infringement. 
 
The DCE, the way it is described below, would be such a holistic approach. It would use all 
the modes of law, norms, the market and architecture, but without excluding anyone. Fur-
ther, it would be ideologically satisfying as it would protect the rights of the copyright 
owners but not limit access or constrain creativity and creation. 
4 How Can the Digital Copyright Exchange Address the 
Copyright Infringement Problem? 
In this section, the argument put forward is that a Digital Copyright Exchange built upon 
the ideas proposed in the Hargreaves Report can have a positive impact on the digital con-
tent market and thereby reduce infringement activity. Firstly, there is an introduction to the 
context from which the proposal of the DCE emerged, thereafter an explanation in broad 
terms of what the DCE is and what it could look like before discussion of the advantages 
and disadvantages of the DCE’s possible impact on the identified infringement problem. 
4.1 Context 
The DCE proposed by the Hargreaves Report is a part of the UK strategy on modernising 
the Intellectual Property framework for the digital age. One aspect of this is to resolve the 
copyright infringement problem.92 The Hargreaves report was commissioned by Prime 
Minister David Cameron in 2010, as he was concerned about whether the current IP 
framework was promoting innovation and growth.93 He referred to the fact that “the found-
ers of Google have said they could never have started their company in Britain” as proof 
that something needed done.94 By saying this, Google was referring to the lack of a fair use 
                                                
92 Hargreaves (2011) p.26, Gowers (2006) pp.3-4. 
93 Hargreaves (2011) p.1. 
94 Sherwin (2011). Rosati (2011) fn.1.  
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exemption which leads to concern that the search engine’s technology taking snapshots of 
other Internet sites could constitute copyright infringement95 and lead to the possible liabil-
ity for illegal content accessed through Google’s website. Suggesting making life easier for 
businesses like Google means taking a step into the on-going ‘IP wars’ between the Con-
tent Industry and technology industries.96 An example of this lobbying tug of war are the 
proposed SOPA97 and PIPA98 US Acts in 2011. These Acts were the result of the Content 
Industry’s99 lobbying effort (valued at over $91 million (546m. NOK))100 arguing they 
were suffering loss from the widespread infringement.101 The Content Industry sought to 
“strengthen copyright holders’ rights”102 and assign liability to search engines and other 
service providers, requiring them not to link to foreign pages that allegedly contain copy-
right infringing content.103 On the other side, the propositions caused uproar amongst tech-
nology companies and service providers such as Google and Yahoo. This was marked with 
a world-embracing protest by 115,000 web sites,104 including Wikipedia that went for a 
total blackout.105 Both sides have their narratives, the Content Industry with their big num-
bers of losses106 and the technology sites with the arguments on constraints of innova-
tion.107 The situation is not helped by the fact that evidence is currently very difficult or 
                                                
95 BBC (2010). See also story 3A in section 3.1.5. 
96 Belleville (2012). 
97 Stop Online Piracy Act. 
98 Preventing Real Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of 
Intellectual Property Act. 
99 See Belleville (2012) p.321. 
100 Belleville (2012) p.318. 
101 Schmitz (2013) p.213. 
102 Belleville (2012) p.304. 
103 Schmitz (2013) p.223. 
104 Wortham (2012). 
105 Schmitz (2013) p.213. 
106 See for example RIAA: 
 http://www.riaa.com/physicalpiracy.php?content_selector=piracy_details_online  
107 Kessler (2011), Belleville (2012) p.321, Gillmor (2011), Gramstad (2013). 
 23 
impossible to obtain, and the methods used to produce evidence are contested.108 On this 
backdrop Hargreaves was meant to suggest change to the copyright framework which satis-
fied all stakeholders. However, due to the wish of PM Cameron, there is a slight bias in 
favour of the technology branch of the debate.  
 
The Hargreaves Report is focused on how to make the IP framework maximise innovation 
and economic growth. The DCE proposal was accepted by the UK Government which ap-
pointed Hooper to undertake a feasibility study of how the DCE could be moved towards 
operational reality.109 Hooper’s work was undertaken in two phases, i) diagnosing110 and ii) 
seeking solutions,111 and following on from this a pilot site of the ‘Copyright Hub’ was 
launched online.112 Although Hooper’s Report excludes copyright infringement from its 
scope, it, and the online trial version show what can be achieved with the DCE and provide 
an example of how the DCE could be built. 
 
The DCE proposed in the Hargreaves Report is not the first project of its kind. There are 
similar projects already developed or planned by the private industry,113 nations,114 and 
organisations such as the WIPO.115 The DCE proposed by the Hargreaves Report is special 
because it links the different creative sectors together on one platform. In addition, it is 
proposed to be non-profit, initiated by the Government, but run and built by the industry. 
The fact that the Government is supporting the project could be helpful for achieving the 
aim of making the platform international especially during the start-up phase when invest-
ments and other incentives are necessary. 
                                                
108 See Mitra-Kahn (2011), Handke (2012), Watt (2009). 
109 Intellectual Property Office (2011). 
110 Hooper (2012, March). 
111 Hooper (2012, July). 
112 www.copyrighthub.co.uk, launched on 08.07.2013 according to CLSG (2013). 
113 See for example, www.gettyimages.com, Copyright Clearance Center www.copyright.com. 
114 http://cce.chinacopyright.co.uk/. 
115 WIPO (2011). 
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4.2 The DCE and its Features 
4.2.1 Beyond Hargreaves 
The manner in which the DCE is proposed in the Hargreaves Report resembles a vision 
rather than being a description of a functioning online platform. The focus in Hargreaves116 
is mostly on the needs and challenges of the copyright stakeholders, how the DCE could 
address these, and how this would stimulate innovation and growth. Copyright infringe-
ment is identified as a problem and supported by statistics, but an analysis of whether the 
DCE could address the copyright infringement problem is, however, lacking. In the follow-
ing, I am analysing the DCE from the viewpoint that, along with addressing the issues con-
sidered by Hargreaves, if created with the infringement problem in mind, it could also ad-
dress this issue. As well as elaborating on the ideas put forward by Hargreaves I suggest to 
develop the DCE in a certain way to best address the infringement problem. One of the 
main aspects of this is to make the DCE equipped for exception handling,117 both with re-
gards to flexible licensing and a quick, cheap and easy way to resolve disputes online, by 
the use of ODR technologies. 
4.2.2 Objectives of the DCE 
Different objectives could affect what the DCE would look like. The DCE could be every-
thing from a database system providing metadata to simplify the process of identification of 
works118 to a fully-fledged marketplace combining features from websites such as eBay, 
GettyImages and Google. The main objective for the DCE as I envision it is to reduce cop-
yright infringement without constraining creativity. Based on my studies of copyright in-
fringement,119 the DCE should have certain characteristics to provide a sufficient substitute 
                                                
116 Hargreaves (2011) ch.4. 
117 In this thesis, this term is not used in the technical sense that it is used in computation theory but rather to 
describe the process of dealing with situations that deviate from the norm and where the standard procedure 
for licensing offered by the DCE cannot sufficiently address the needs of the user. 
118 Griffin (2013) p.10.  
119 See section 3, esp. 3.2. 
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for the potential infringer. Particularly important are access, simplicity, safety and low cost. 
Therefore, the DCE here envisaged would be an online marketplace where the trade of 
rights to creative works takes place.120 Users could search for and identify content on a 
website offering a user-friendly, easy and intuitive interface. Acting as a metawebsite, the 
DCE would be the first port-of-call for accessing information and content from a network 
of interoperable databases from all creative sectors121 as well as accessing information and 
content directly uploaded to the DCE.122 Furthermore, the DCE would ideally be cross-
territorial123 reflecting the international nature of the world of digital content. At the same 
time the DCE would work with initiatives such as the Linked Content Coalition to provide 
a standard rights information infrastructure.124  
4.2.3 Automatic Licensing 
Hargreaves proposes that the DCE is based on automatic licensing.125 This would also be a 
main aspect of the concept of the DCE in this thesis. Following a standard126 automatic 
licensing procedure, the website would allow licensors to easily distribute their content and 
offer a range of options regarding their terms and conditions. The licensees could then 
choose from these options, and easily and immediately purchase the licence required.127 
Different rates due to the field of use, the format of use, the manner of use, the target mar-
ket, and the industry128 could apply, and the whole licensing process would be done in se-
conds. For Kristoffer and Kari in MindStudy such a service could help save time and mon-
                                                
120 Hargreaves (2011) para.4.12. 
121 Hargreaves (2011) paras.4.31, 4.42. 
122 It is acknowledged that this vision of the DCE would involve a number of data protection issues. However, 
this is a large subject of discussion which is outwith the scope of this thesis.  
123 A Single EU Market for Content is suggested in Hargreaves (2011) p.35. 
124 Hargreaves (2011) p.33, Hooper (2012, July) p.43. 
125 Hargreaves para.4.23. 
126 Distinguished from exception handling procedures below. 
127 Hooper (2012, March) p.12, Hooper (2012, July) p.8. 
128 These examples of categories here are taken from GettyImages licensing options for rights-managed 
photos, www.gettyimages.com. 
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ey as they could get the rights to all types of digital content in one place. If they needed to 
acquire different licences for the films sold for educational purposes and for those sold to 
psychology practices, they could do this as they selected their field of use. 
 
The automatic licensing as suggested by Hargreaves provides a feature which acts on the 
behalf of the licensor. The licensor only needs to set terms and conditions, then the DCE 
does the rest together with the licensee who selects his or her desired terms.129 The automa-
tion can be taken further by allowing licensees to enter into agreements automatically, 
which for big scale licensees (belonging to group 3) can be useful. The story about MyN-
ews above can serve as an example of this. When MyNews aggregates news from around 
the web, this happens with such a frequency and speed that acquiring single licences is not 
possible. Therefore the company has been taking the risk of operating in the grey areas of 
the law.130 The DCE could provide the automated licensing procedure needed. Thus, when 
the MyNews computer system discovers a news story it will include in its service, it could, 
if connected to the DCE, automatically identify the author or right owner of the news story 
(which when published had been automatically registered on the DCE), and automatically 
select the appropriate licence.  
 
In enabling the DCE to carry out the mentioned processes, software called autonomous or 
intelligent agents is essential.131 Such agents are already apparent in most e-commerce plat-
forms; they autonomously “send bids, accept offers, request quotes, negotiate deals and 
make contracts”,132 saving time and effort for the users. The term autonomous refers to the 
agents’ ability not only carry out the task they are instructed to do, but also initiate the pro-
cesses themselves.133 Legally, the use of autonomous agents which perform and initiate 
                                                
129 This is how most e-commerce sites, like www.amazon.com, use automation. 
130 See subsection 3.1.5, story 3A. 
131 There are many synonymous terms without clear definition, Weitzenboek (2001) pp.206-208. However, 
the essential here is the agent’s ‘autonomous’ behaviour. 
132 Pagallo (2013) p.58. 
133 Nwana (1996) p.209. 
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actions can raise issues regarding responsibility and liability. Is the principal of the agent 
liable under a contract she did not know was entered into by her agent? Three main solu-
tions to this problem have been repeatedly considered to this problem: i) granting the au-
tonomous agents some kind of a legal personality and thereby responsibility, ii) considering 
such agents under the law of agency, and iii) considering the agents only as means of 
communication, i.e. actions done by the agent are considered as actions done by its princi-
pal.134 There is no conclusion in the literature which approach is the best. However, in cur-
rent legislation specifically about autonomous agents135 or on “contracts to be concluded by 
electronic means”, the latter seems to be adopted.136 Although this approach inevitably 
raises questions concerning whether essential elements of a valid contract such as capacity 
and consent are fulfilled,137 especially in the case of a subjective consent theory,138 this is 
the approach that causes least change to the existing legal system, which can be the reason 
why this is the preferable choice for the lawmaker. Many would also simply think that “to 
develop a notion of the software as a sort of legal person does not appear as a temping op-
tion.”139  
 
As the use of intelligent agents increases, there will be a need for further research on the 
relationship between computers and human users and a new legal framework on the actions 
of computers might be considered appropriate. Until this happens we have to continue with 
                                                
134 Full discussion of this is not within the scope of this thesis. See Weitzenboeck (2001) who discusses all 
three options, Pagallo (2013), who draws on Roman law and compares with the way slaves were given a 
certain responsibility even though they were the property of their masters, and Dahiyat (2010), who 
“contemplates whether or not it is possible to share the responsibility with these agents” (in abstract). 
135 Such as  MLEC Art.2, Art.13(2)b and Electronic Communications Convention 
Art.12. 
136 For example, Dir./2000/31/EC Art.9(1).  
137 Weitzenboeck (2001) p.210, Bing (2003) p.45. 
138 Weitzenboeck (2001) p.221. 
139 Bing (2003) p.46. 
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liability on the principal. The risk to the user will be balanced with the convenience of the 
use. For the DCE such convenience is therefore essential.  
4.2.4 Exception Handling  
Coming back to the functionality and user-friendliness of the DCE, Hargreaves did not 
consider exception handling,140 which for many users could be essential. Fixed terms and 
no room for individual adjustment could be too rigid and inflexible, which could render the 
DCE unviable for them. There are two stages of the licensing process where exception 
handling could be necessary for the users. Firstly, negotiation in the process of entering 
into the licensing agreement, and secondly, resolving disputes subsequent to the initial 
agreement. To address these needs this thesis suggests offering an Online Dispute Resolu-
tion service within the DCE, considered in detail separately in section 5. 
4.2.5 Moral Rights 
When reading the Hargreaves report, the economic side of copyright is indeed prevalent.141 
This might not be surprising as the most important aspect of the DCE is to make exploita-
tion of copyrighted content quick and easy. A complementary explanation, furthermore, 
could be the economic focus in the Common Law rationale of copyright,142 which the Har-
greaves proposal is built upon. However, copyright law also comprises the moral rights of 
the author, 143 and these rights require consideration. Therefore, to build trust and attract 
users, the DCE would benefit from creating certainty about how moral rights are protected. 
This would be of particular importance if introduced in Norway and Civil Law countries 
where moral rights have a stronger tradition.144 As envisaged here, the DCE could protect 
                                                
140 Including a negotiating agent is mentioned by Hargreaves (2011) para.4.23, but this is not considered in 
any depth, neither is the idea of including a low-cost dispute resolution system. 
141 For critique of this approach see Rahmatian (2011). 
142 MacQueen (2011) p.44. 
143 Moral rights are protected in the Berne Convention Art.6bis. In Norway moral rights are protected by 
Åndsverksloven §3 jf. §39 and in the UK by CDPA Ch.IV. 
144 Rognstad (2009) p.197. 
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of moral rights in two ways. Firstly, the licensor, when stating her terms and conditions for 
automatic licensing, could also submit limitations on how the content could be used, in 
which context it could be used, or specify the only permitted use of the content. It may 
nevertheless be difficult to foresee all kinds of situations in a licensing contract and if this 
was attempted the terms and conditions could become too complicated for the standard 
automatic procedure of the DCE. Therefore, secondly, the ODR facility would play an im-
portant role regarding moral rights, both when forming agreements and if disputes arose. In 
the agreement phase the ODR would allow more flexibility than the standard licensing pro-
cedure would, and when resolving disputes it would be more flexible, far less costly and 
quicker than court proceedings.145  
4.3 The Advantages of the DCE 
The previous sections discussed what would be the main features of the DCE as envisaged 
by this thesis. This section will consider in detail how the DCE will contribute towards 
tackling the copyright infringement problem. Hargreaves and Hooper identified the prob-
lems copyright stakeholders are facing based on rounds of calls for evidence. The DCE was 
proposed to resolve many of these problems, and numerous advantages of the DCE in this 
regard were illuminated in three reports.146 The advantages discussed therein can be re-
duced to five categories: increasing access, reducing complexity, reducing risk, norms and 
education, and price. Although the DCE as envisaged here differs from Hargreaves’ ver-
sion on various points, the same categories are still suitable. In the following these catego-
ries are discussed in relation to the categories of reasons for infringement identified in sec-
tion 3.2. The categories are interconnected and inevitably overlap slightly. As the infringers 
are on the licensee-side of the DCE this will be the focus. However, what happens on the 
supply side also affects the level of infringement and will be considered where appropriate. 
                                                
145 See further below at section 5. 
146 See Hargreaves (2011) pp.29,31,33,35, Hooper (2012, March) p.7, Hooper (2012, July) p.29. 
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4.3.1 Access 
In section 3.2 insufficient access to legal content was identified as one of the main reasons 
why copyright infringement occurs. Access to content is fundamental for fostering creativi-
ty.147 By providing an open market place where a large amount of material is available, the 
DCE would, quite simply, increase legal access to copyrighted content. 
 
An important element is the means by which users could access content. The first step for 
potential users would be to find the DCE website and the content offered there. The DCE 
would be competing with extremely simple access to illegal content (e.g. through a Google 
search). Using the power of choice architecture, nudging potential users of the DCE in the 
right direction, searching online could be a part of the DCE process.148 Cooperation with 
online navigation services like Google could make content available at the DCE first hit in 
searches.  
 
Further, instead of removing metadata, as Facebook and Twitter are currently doing,149 
such websites could be encouraged to link up with the DCE and undertake automatic 
searches for content that users are uploading. For example when Oline wants to share on 
Facebook a new jazz track she has found, she could automatically be presented with rights 
information along with an easy route to acquire the appropriate licence. Studies show that 
the default choice is very likely to be taken.150 Making licensing on the DCE the default 
choice could plausibly reduce infringement without limiting the freedom of choice for us-
ers.  
 
When having found the content or the website, the second step for keeping the users atten-
tion could be a user-friendly interface offering simple and efficient search and browse fea-
                                                
147 See section 3.3.1. 
148 Thaler (2008). 
149 Laurent (2013). 
150 Thaler (2008) p.35. See also Kahneman (1991) pp.197-198, Samuelson (1988) on the ‘staus-quo bias’.  
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tures along with sole registration for accessing content and content information from all 
sectors. To support clarifying the copyright law for the users, the system should also re-
member users and their legal position regarding copyright. The MindStudy story can be an 
example. If Kari logged on to the DCE, she would be recognised as a student. She could 
find content or identify content already found elsewhere, along with the prices relevant for 
her. If content was found through a Google search, this could then lead her to the DCE. The 
system would know about any exemptions for educational purposes, any collective licens-
ing agreements, whether the protection period of the work in question had ended or about 
any special terms applied by the rightholder. For MindStudy, as a student project, some 
content could be free of use. When wanting to commercialise the film, Kari could change 
the purposes for which she wanted to use the content, the system could provide updated 
information and the two situations could easily be compared.  
 
When users have accessed the DCE the next step is to have content available for the users. 
This is essential to be a sufficient substitute to illegal services. Providing access to a legal 
alternative would lead to less infringement151 and is necessary to make the DCE the “one 
stop shop”152 it should be. In order to compete with the great supply of illegal services, the 
DCE should aim to have similar or better supply. DCE would aim for access to as much 
content as possible and from all sectors – which is currently not offered by any other ser-
vice. A starting point to achieve this could be to include databases from libraries, national 
broadcasters, museums and other publicly-owned copyright material on the DCE. Further, 
Governments could give incentives to private businesses and rightholders for supplying 
content.153 Moreover, the DCE platform should be easy-to-use for suppliers of content. The 
platform would, on one hand, enable authors to directly distribute their content within regu-
lated forms without assistance of an additional intermediary, and, on the other hand, offer a 
                                                
151 Ofcom (2012) p.2. 
152 Hargreaves (2011) p.35. 
153 Suggested by Hargreaves para.4.34. This could raise competition law issues, which is beyond the scope of 
this thesis.  
 32 
channel for collecting societies and other already established intermediaries to reach their 
customers. With such great supply in addition to the other advantages described, the DCE 
could take over some of the illegal market. Offering such a supply will remove the reason 
for some users to infringe and they would in many cases choose legally available con-
tent.154 
4.3.2 Reducing Complexity 
In section 3.2 complexity was identified as one of the reasons why copyright infringement 
occurs. The DCE proposes to drastically reduce the complexity in licensing procedures. 
 
Complexity is apparent when the user wants to establish who holds the copyrights to a 
work and who is managing them. Currently there are many collecting societies155 and other 
intermediaries involved in rights management. The efficiency of such systems may vary 
between countries, and can result in a significant task for users wanting to secure the ap-
propriate rights. In Norway and other Nordic countries, there are robust Extended Collec-
tive Licence (‘ECL’)156 regimes.157 However, within this regime the one-stop-shop effect of 
the DCE could simplify the licensing process, as ECL does not cover all uses of copyright-
ed content. Furthermore, ECL regimes could be implemented in the DCE e.g. allowing 
national broadcasters to freely use content. On the DCE a sole search could be sufficient to 
get all the needed rights information to allow a licence to be purchased.  
 
The next step of the licensing procedure would be to enter into a licensing agreement. Con-
sidering the automated procedure as described above, this would be simple and quick. If 
not satisfied with the options available, the user could initiate a negotiation procedure on 
the ODR feature by pushing a button.   
                                                
154 Ofcom (2012) p.2. 
155 More than 250 in the EU, European Commission (2012). 
156 These are collective licences that are not restricted to members of the rights management organisation, but 
are extended to all rightholders within the relevant field.  
157 Rognstad (2012) p.621. 
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Many of the problems that, for example, start-up businesses online have concern the inter-
national aspect of copyright licensing. Although the current copyright framework is heavily 
international there are still a lot of differences from country to country. Spotify had, for 
example, severe problems with entering the US market due to negotiations with large rec-
ord companies and the US launch was delayed for about two years.158 The more the DCE 
would be an international platform, with many countries participating, the easier it would 
be for the user to acquire all the licences required in a single transaction.  
4.3.3 Reducing risk 
In section 3.2.1 above certain disadvantages with infringement were identified. It is as-
sumed that users consciously or subconsciously undertake a cost-benefit analysis before 
choosing where to get the content. It is appreciated that the risks involved in copyright in-
fringement are low at the moment. However, the DCE would reduce risk even further and 
therefore people would prefer to use this legal method of accessing content, which would 
contribute to reducing infringement.159 
 
A clear risk of infringement is the risk of getting malware, whether it is a damaging virus 
or spyware enabling access to sensitive information. The DCE could significantly reduce 
the risk by actively controlling content. Furthermore, if the user got malware from an ille-
gal service, placing liability and pursuing a claim of damages is difficult. If this happened 
on the DCE in spite of the security measures, it would be easier to identify the content pro-
vider due to the registration procedures and/or the DCE could take on liability to some ex-
tent as a guarantor of secure content. 
 
                                                
158 Rooney (2011). 
159 The particular risk of social condemnation is considered separately in the following section.  
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The use of copyrighted content has also been associated with the risk of unjustified threats 
of infringement proceedings.160 As an example GettyImages adapted an aggressive ap-
proach in claiming damages for alleged infringement. They have been sending out letters in 
bulk threatening court action in event that the alleged infringer fails to pay the suggested 
settlement sum.161 This practice has also been undertaken by law firms.162 Such threats can 
hinder lawful exploitation of content by making the recipients anxious of using the content 
in question, even though they might have the right to do so. In addition, the fear of a justi-
fied threat might also rise. When businesses are undertaking a risk assessment, the per-
ceived high risk of being sued even when they think they are using content legally, might 
put them off creating at all, or they may intentionally choose illegal content, where at least 
the content is available for free and this would then compensate for the perceived cost of 
litigation. It is suggested that this situation results from uncertainty within copyright, for 
example, lack of knowledge combined with the often complicated legal test of copyright 
infringement.163 It is suggested that a system like the DCE, that could clearly identify to 
what extent the work in question is protected, would contribute towards higher certainty 
regarding copyright and thereby lower risk of both unjustified and justified threats of litiga-
tion.164 This would again lead to the DCE being chosen by users. 
4.3.4 Norms and education 
As discussed in section 3.2, the lack of a general norm supporting copyright hence lack of 
social condemnation in society is likely to be one of the reasons behind infringement. This 
thesis argues that the DCE could have the potential to change people’s online behaviour. 
One of the ways that the DCE could do this is by changing norms. The DCE is proposed to 
have an important educational function and be the place to find information about copy-
                                                
160 Griffin & Nair (2013) p.280. 
161 See for instance the association CopyrightInfringement at www.copyrightinfringement.org.uk that was 
established to help people who get such letters, and http://stepdev.net/Blogg/brev-fra-getty. 
162  Griffin & Nair (2013) p.281, Fiveash, K. (2011). 
163 Griffin & Nair (2013) p.291. 
164 Griffin & Nair (2013) pp.291-292, de Rosnay (2012) p.xiii. 
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right.165 One example of such an informational role is the current version of Hooper’s 
DCE: www.copyrighthub.co.uk, another example is the Norwegian www.clara.no. By also 
collaborating with educational institutions, the use of the DCE, the reasons for using it and 
the benefits of doing so would get familiar to future generations and create a culture of In-
ternet use where infringement is not such a natural part of it. As an example the DCE could 
be a handy tool in all school projects where for example Powerpoint presentations, videos 
and other products involving digital content are being made. Through education, the risk of 
social condemnation for copyright infringement which is currently not present would in-
crease and this risk would, of course, be non-existent for the users of the DCE.   
 
In order to achieve this educational effect the DCE should not only offer information about 
copyright and copyright licensing, but the price of licensing should also be feasible for ed-
ucational purposes. Exemptions or limitations to copyright and collective licences to make 
use of copyrighted content for educational purposes easier exist in many countries, the UK 
and Norway included.166 By including these in the DCE system, the content in question 
could be accessible for free by students, while the school or Government could be charged. 
Many online scientific articles are currently available for free through library services for 
students and staff at educational institutions, and with the DCE this could be extended to 
more content.  
4.3.5 Price 
In section 3.2 the high cost of legally accessing content was identified as one of the main 
reasons why copyright infringement occurs. It is proposed that the DCE could cut costs for 
both consumers and other users.  
 
                                                
165 Hargreaves (2011) para.4.23. 
166 See for example CDPA s.32-36A and Åndsverksloven §§13,13a,13b,16,18,20,21. 
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When people are asked why they choose to use illegal services many answer that it is be-
cause it is free.167 For consumers the price tag on the desired content is most important. The 
DCE could, for the following reasons, make it possible for legal content to be available at a 
low cost. Firstly, the DCE could state which content is free of use, e.g. belongs to the pub-
lic domain or is regulated by a Creative Commons168 licence or similar regime. Personal-
ised accounts could inform the user about exemptions or similar limits to copyright appli-
cable for the respective user, such as in the educational example in the previous section. 
Secondly, consumers are arguably not considering risk when perceiving illegal content as 
free. As long as the activity has an economic risk, the DCE can limit this.169 Thirdly, the 
price on provided content could be reduced due to increased competition. The DCE would 
provide easier access to the market to suppliers, including those that are smaller and inde-
pendent, and free legal content as mentioned above would also contribute to increased 
competition. Finally, reduction in transaction costs for content providers, which the DCE 
would offer, would trickle down and allow price reduction on provided contract. The latter 
may, however, raise competition issues, depending whether the funding structure had Gov-
ernment involvement,170 but further discussion of these issues are outwith the scope of this 
thesis.   
 
The identified infringers of groups 2 and 3 have a more complex interaction with content. 
MindStudy needs to use and obtain clearance content from many different creative sectors. 
Business models based on redistribution of content, such as MyNews, need access and 
rights to use a great amount of content. For these, high costs are involved in all stages of 
the licensing process. Too high costs for this type of user might have two outcomes, either 
no use would take place hence no service or creation of new works, or the use would be 
based on infringement where the immediate transaction costs are much lower. The DCE’s 
                                                
167 Ofcom High Value (2013) p.90. 
168 www.creativecommons.org. 
169 Section 4.3.3. 
170 See e.g. TFEU Art.107.  
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reduction in complexity and increase in ease of access would result in lower costs involved 
in obtaining legal content for these users which could therefore both lead to more creation 
and distribution, and less infringement.  
4.4 The Challenges of the DCE 
What has been suggested above is ambitious and some points would represent big chal-
lenges. There are also disadvantages with the DCE in general. In this subsection the main 
challenges and disadvantages will be discussed. 
 
The DCE is proposed as a dominant website, and in order to succeed it would need a high 
participation of all copyright stakeholders; user-friendliness per se is not enough. To 
achieve dominance and acceptance by users would be a great challenge. However, if the 
DCE starts up by offering all publicly-owned content and cooperates up with other non-
profit databases such as Imslp Petrucci Music Library, Europeana and Project Guten-
berg,171 along with encouraging independent artists to distribute their content, the DCE 
would already be in quite a strong position from which it could grow. 
 
Although it is suggested in this thesis that the DCE should be an international project, this 
would require information to be input regarding the copyright laws of many different na-
tions. There may also be translation issues if the website was to be available for use in all 
languages. These requirements would involve significant investment in terms of time and 
cost.   
 
The funding structure of the DCE would need thorough consideration, which is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. Hargreaves suggested funding support from Governments in the start-
up phase, along with private investments. Reasonable membership fees172 for licensors are 
                                                
171 See www.imslp.org, www.europeana.eu, www.gutenberg.org.  
172 These fees would have to be calculated so as to not cancel out the savings for licensors in being part of the 
DCE, see above section 4.3.5. 
 38 
a possible solution for maintenance costs and the potential cost of the DCE as a guarantor 
of malware. These would be fees only for commercial licensors. Another solution could be 
allowing advertisement. Despite these options for funding, it is acknowledged that the DCE 
would be an expensive project, although due to the losses that copyright infringement cur-
rently produces,173 spending on a large scale may be justified.  
 
Finally, as the DCE would be a trustable source of rights information, hence a type of reg-
istry of copyrights, it could affect the role of copyright law.174 What would be decided if a 
work registered on the DCE was challenged by someone claiming that the work in question 
was a rip-off of her non-registered work. In order to achieve predictability, should registra-
tion be the prevailing authority? If this should be answered positively, an authority would 
be required to assess each and every work before registration to ensure that correct author 
or right-owner was registered. There is a chance that such system could lead to unfair re-
sults, as weaker parties (who did not think about registration) could be taken advantage of 
and copyright theft could occur. However, provided there is a successful educational role of 
the DCE, most authors would be aware of registration. In addition, the registration proce-
dure would be simple, quick and could be undertaken on any device connected to Internet. 
It has been suggested that the copyright system should change fundamentally and formali-
ties should be reintroduced.175 However, there is also a strong argument that the last word 
on copyright should remain with the court and registration with the DCE would only act as 
evidence for right ownership.176 This would be consistent with the voluntary use of the 
DCE. 
                                                
173 See section 1 above.  
174 Griffin (2013) p.11. 
175 Van Gompel (2011). 
176 As promoted by the Copyright House in the UK at http://www.copyrighthouse.co.uk/copyright/why-
register-copyright.htm. A thorough introduction to this topic is given in Van Gompel (2011) and Elkin-Koren 
(2013). 
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4.5 Why the DCE Should be Introduced in Norway 
The figures quoted in the introduction of this thesis showed that copyright infringement is 
apparent in Norway. The reasons for copyright infringement were identified and thereafter 
the unsuccessful traditional approach to enforcement in general and Norway’s recent re-
forms on the subject in particular were discussed. Norway could benefit from adopting the 
holistic approach of the DCE which, as argued previously in this section, could provide a 
more effective solution to copyright infringement. The DCE, as proposed, would also fit 
well into the Norwegian legal system. To include the ODR service, discussed further be-
low, as part of the DCE would complement a strong tradition of Norwegian mediation, 
both on the international political level177 and as part of the court system. The treatment of 
moral rights through ODR would also correspond with the strong moral rights protection in 
Norway.178 Such a technological solution would fit well with, and further stimulate, an al-
ready vibrant creative sector in Norway that is said to have the world’s most advanced mu-
sic business with 78% of the revenue from digital sources.179 Furthermore, the DCE could 
be highly accessible to the Norwegian population as broadband is available in 99.9% of 
Norwegian households.180  
 
As can be seen from the above discussion, an international version of the DCE would make 
trade of copyrights significantly easier and therefore remove and mitigate reasons for copy-
right infringement. For this reason, it would beneficial for Norway to take part in such a 
service as participation would be likely to reduce the high incidence of copyright infringe-
ment and its related losses.  
 
However, even if only adopted in Norway, the DCE would have benefits. The DCE could 
facilitate trade between Norway and the rest of the world. For export of Norwegian culture, 
                                                
177 Nyhamar (2007) p.76. 
178  See section 4.2.5. 
179 Mashup (2014) introduction. 
180 Fornyings-, administrasjons- og kirkedepartementet (2013). 
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a single point of access for foreign licensors would simplify the licensing process with the 
potential effect of an increase in exports. Such a system is highly relevant as it is argued 
that there are great challenges in Norwegian music export at the moment and that there is a 
large potential for this export.181 Furthermore, an initiative has been started to encourage 
development of technology to facilitate export,182 which indicates that there could be a role 
for the DCE in Norway. If the DCE was to develop into an international platform, Norway 
could arguably be a beneficial country in which to launch such a platform.  
 
Finally, also internally in Norway, the DCE would have a role of disseminating culture and 
encouraging creation among the many Internet users, along with at the same time protect-
ing Norwegian culture. 
5 Online Dispute Resolution 
In order to succeed the DCE’s greatest assets should be user-friendliness and functionality. 
The more easy-to-use features that would help the user achieve her goal of acquiring legal 
content, the better. In this context, it must be recognised that not all users of the DCE are 
the same and some will have needs that are not served by the standard licensing procedure. 
Furthermore, despite best endeavours, disputes on the DCE will occur. An ODR feature 
would therefore be a significant benefit to the DCE and would be used for two purposes: i) 
for contract formation purposes where the desired licence is not catered for183 and ii) as a 
cheap and quick method of resolving disputes. In the following sections, there is a brief 
introduction to the concept of ODR. Thereafter, the typical sorts of disputes which would 
occur on the DCE are considered. The main features of the suggested ODR service are then 
presented and finally, the benefits and challenges of the ODR for the DCE are discussed.  
                                                
181 Gjestad (2014). 
182 Gjestad (2014), MashUp (2014). 
183 It may be seen as odd to discuss contract formation negotiations within this section on ODR. However, as 
both contract formation and dispute resolution would use the same negotiation features of the ODR and both 
can be considered under the concept of “exception handling”, it is helpful to treat them together.  
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5.1 What is ODR? 
ODR is a concept which originated from the online application of Alternative Dispute Res-
olution (‘ADR’). ODR can be defined as electronic-assisted dispute resolution, i.e. a pro-
cess that to some extent includes the use of electronic means such as e-mail, telephone, 
videoconference tools or the Internet and can be used for disputes arising both off- and 
online.184 The ODR proposed in this thesis is suggested to deal only with disputes arising 
from transactions on the DCE185 and the entire procedure will preferably be conducted over 
the Internet.186 As ODR can be considered as online application of ADR ideas,187 the most 
common types of ODR can be roughly categorised as negotiation, mediation and arbitra-
tion.188 Negotiation consists of the voluntary exchange of information between the parties 
aiming for an agreement. In mediation, a neutral third party assists the negotiation and in 
some incidents suggests an outcome the parties can accept or reject. In arbitration the par-
ties agree upon an arbitrator whose decision on the matter is binding.189  
 
The proposed ODR service includes software-assisted negotiation with the extension of 
human mediation. In light of the business model of the DCE which would involve high-
volume, low-value exchanges, arbitration would arguably get too expensive and liability-
generating for the DCE. In cases where the parties are seeking a binding decision by a third 
party they would have to seek other fora, e.g. an external arbitrator or the court.   
5.2 Potential Disputes on the DCE  
In order to consider how ODR could be beneficial to the DCE, the potential types of dis-
putes specific to the DCE need to be identified. There are two possible constellations of 
                                                
184 Goodman (2003) p.1, Schiavetta (2004). 
185 See section 4.2. 
186 This ‘branch’ of ODR has also been called e-ADR, see Schiavetta (2008) p.30.  
187 Katsh (2004)  pp.275-277. 
188 Cole (2006) p.196. 
188 Katsh (2001) p.816. 
189 Goltsman (2009) p.1397. 
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disputes arising from the DCE. These are licensor v. licensee and user v. DCE. An essential 
feature of ADR is that the negotiator/mediator is a neutral third party.190 This would not be 
possible in an ODR service, provided by the DCE, which dealt with user v. DCE disputes. 
Therefore, this type of dispute will not be considered further. The licensor v. licensee dis-
putes could roughly be divided into three categories: i) “eBay disputes”, ii) disputes regard-
ing licensing terms and conditions and iii) disputes regarding interests other than monetary 
interests.  
5.2.1 eBay Disputes 
The ‘eBay-disputes’ category resembles typical disputes arising from an e-commerce web-
site like eBay.191 The DCE is similar to eBay in being a platform facilitating trade between 
sellers/licensors and buyers/licensees. The typical recurring disputes in such environments 
are related to payment, delivery of content and quality of delivered content.192 Such dis-
putes would presumably also originate from the DCE. However, as all the content on the 
DCE would be digital, it is plausible that issues like delayed delivery typically associated 
with non-digital goods sold on eBay would be drastically reduced. Nevertheless, issues 
regarding payment, corrupted content and bad quality of content could still occur. 
5.2.2 Licensing Terms and Conditions  
As the DCE would be based on licensing, many different types of licences and specific 
terms and conditions could occur, creating relationships often more complex than a basic 
buyer/seller relationship and giving room for more points to disagree on. As a licence of 
use regulates the use after the contracting stage, there would be potential for disputes re-
garding the use, such as whether the content has been used too long, in a setting not cov-
ered in the agreement, or too many copies had been made. Disagreement of the interpreta-
tion of terms and conditions could be a source of dispute. Furthermore, situations where the 
licensor grants a licence conflicting with a third party’s right could occur, for example, in 
                                                
190 See e.g. Dir.2008/52/EC Art. 3b, 4b, EU (2004) s.2. 
191 eBay was a pioneer within ODR using firstly SquareTrade and now Modria http://www.modria.com/.  
192 Chong (2001). 
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the case where the licensor has transferred an exclusive licence to one party and regardless 
subsequently transfers a licence to a second party.  
5.2.3 Moral Rights 
Contrasting with the two categories above which generally would be dealing with pecuniar-
ily measurable issues, the final category involves disputes where non-pecuniary interests 
are at stake, such as, regarding moral rights. Moral rights aspects could, as mentioned in the 
previous section, be reflected in the licence, making the source of the dispute the same as in 
category two above. The nature of the dispute would, however, differ. Furthermore, statuto-
ry protection of moral rights and the interpretation of this could also be subject to dispute. 
Disputes regarding moral rights are likely to be between the author and a re-user. Marte 
from the story 2B could serve as an example here. Assume that Marte had acquired licenc-
es to the content she had been using as a freelance editor in the celebrity field from the 
DCE. One of the photographs was taken by the photographer Anne, renowned for her work 
within the health and fitness sector and Marte had been granted an unlimited right to use 
the photo in the magazines she was working for over a period of 5 years. There was still 
one year left of the licence period when Marte modified the photo, added some text and her 
company used it in an advertising campaign for deep-fried Mars bars. As soon as Anne 
discovered this, she contacted Marte through the DCE and claimed her moral rights had 
been violated. 
5.3 Features of the ODR Service in the DCE 
The ODR service envisaged includes both software-based negotiation and human media-
tion, although it would be desirable for the system to handle most cases without human 
intervention. This section presents the various features of the ODR system and how they 
would serve the user in either the contract formation or dispute context.   
5.3.1 Automation 
The use of software-based negotiation will be discussed first. Although the technology that 
would be adopted for formation of contract and dispute resolution would be very similar 
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and basically within the e-negotiation category,193 the needs for the user could differ in the 
two situations. 
5.3.1.1 Contract formation 
In the contract formation phase there is nothing binding the parties together in the way a 
licence or a legal claim does in the case of dispute resolution, so each party could at any 
moment leave the negotiations. Furthermore, most transactions entered into on the DCE are 
likely to be of low value and the importance for the parties to reach agreement would not 
be as great as in big commercial deals or when trying to settle a dispute. Additionally, the 
potential licensee would, when choosing negotiation rather than the standard process, be 
likely to know the terms of licence she is looking for. Therefore satisfaction for the user, 
here the licensee, could be achieved with a simple interface facilitating interaction with the 
licensor to add flexibility to the DCE. Appropriate for this could be a messenger system 
like those found on social media sites like Facebook. Interaction could happen manually 
from both sides. However, it could be convenient for licensors with high demand to also 
here be relieved from manual labour by using autonomous agents which reply according to 
given preferences. This would additionally make the process quicker for the licensee who 
would not have to wait for manual reply. In addition to the messenger system, the system 
could have a bank of suggested style licence clauses available upon which the parties can 
agree to allow quick resolution of the negotiation.  
 
As an example, Oline started using the DCE. She wanted to share the music she found with 
her friends in the jazz forum. On the DCE she could acquire a licence for “making the pur-
chased content public on the Internet”, but as the jazz forum was a closed group, she 
thought it would be possible to get a cheaper licence. For this purpose she was happy to 
find the option of contract formation negotiation, where she would be able to negotiate with 
the licensor on price.  
                                                
193 Thiessen (2012) p.341. 
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5.3.1.2 Dispute resolution 
In a dispute situation there is more at stake than in contract formation as a contract and per-
haps a legal claim are binding the parties together. The users would have an extra incentive 
to use the ODR as an alternative to litigation, or in smaller disputes, loss for one party. 
Simply facilitating interaction between disputing parties would be a part of the dispute res-
olution process, as for contract formation. However, to increase the chance for settlement, 
it is also suggested to also offer further assistance. 
 
Further support could be provided by various tools based on negotiation software agents 
that could further help the parties understand their interests, position and options.194 The 
interface could either be organised as a negotiation workbench195 where the users could 
choose freely between negotiation tools, or the software could take more control over the 
process, leading the parties through a pathway of questions where appropriate tools were 
recommended based on the information gathered. In such a pathway, the system could ana-
lyse and formulate the problem, suggest appropriate tools and generate different solutions 
for the parties to consider.196 At the same time the system could detect the emotional state 
of the parties, inform the parties about the influence such state could have on the process 
and adjust its suggestions according to this.197 
 
For the experienced negotiator the basic ODR system could be preferable due to more free-
dom of choice. However, for the normal user of the DCE, too much choice could be con-
fusing. The advanced ODR version with more guidance and a higher level of assistance is 
likely to be preferable and could lead to more satisfied users and a higher number of set-
tlements. One solution that would maintain flexibility would be having the latter version as 
default but with the possibility to opt out of the former. 
                                                
194 Van Veenen (2010a) p.4.  
195 Kersten (2008) pp.471-472. 
196 Ibid. pp.472, 478-479. 
197  See further Picard (2002), Van Veenen (2010), Zondag (2007). 
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To further envisage the process, and to provide some examples of the tools which could be 
part of the ODR service, MindStudy from section 3.1.3 can serve as an example. Assume 
that MindStudy had acquired a licence on the DCE to use a video clip in their film. Alt-
hough they were not sure whether the licence covered this, they also used parts of the clip 
in the film trailer. After a while they received an SMS notification from the DCE that the 
licensor, who had discovered this, wished to discuss the matter. As Kristoffer and Kari had 
no experience in disputes and were not too sure about how much a reasonable price for 
acquiring a licence would have been, they were worried about being exploited by the licen-
sor. However, as the process was free they decided to give it a try and they could opt out at 
any moment. By accepting, they were taken to the ODR interface which informed about the 
claim from the licensor and questioned their point of view. The system advised them to use 
the BATNA/WATNA tool, which would show them the possible outcomes if the negotia-
tion failed.  
5.3.1.2.1 Batna and Watna 
Informing disputants of the best alternative to a negotiated agreement (‘BATNA’) is an 
important factor for achieving more agreements in online negotiation.198 For the regular 
DCE user who might know little about disputes, such as Kristoffer and Kari, it would calm 
and assure them by giving them some information about their position right at the start of 
the process and ultimately give them confidence to reach a settlement. More accurately, 
they would be better equipped to determine what would be a good agreement to enter into 
(better than their BATNA) and what would be better to reject (worse than their BATNA), 
and whether to continue the ODR process at all.199 The BATNA for Kristoffer and Kari 
would be that the licensor would consider it too expensive and time consuming to litigate 
against them and would take no further action. However, there is the possibility that parties 
get overly positive regarding their BATNA, leading to rejection of negotiation. In these 
                                                
198 Zeleznikow (2011) p.17, Klaming (2008) p.93. 
199 Zeleznikov (2011) p.17, Andrade (2010) p.7. 
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cases, information about the worst alternative to negotiated agreement (‘WATNA’) could 
create a more realistic perception about their situation and encourage them to settle.200 In 
Kristoffer and Kari’s situation, the WATNA may be a successful action against them where 
they would have to pay damages for copyright infringement.  
5.3.1.2.2 Fair Market Price 
For disputes regarding price of a licence, where for example the licensor claims that the 
user has temporary exceeded the licence or used the content for non-licensed purposes such 
as in the case of MindStudy, having an objective price201 for the licence in question could 
ease the settlement of a dispute. To find such a price there has, for example, been patented 
software for intellectual property audit system.202 There are three accepted approaches to 
find a fair market price.203 Firstly, the cost approach, where the reproduction or replace-
ment price is considered before deducting any decrease in value. One problem with this 
approach is that the creation of content is not reflected in the “economic earning power or 
the value of the property.”204 Secondly, the market approach considers “the price paid for 
similar property in arm’s length transactions.”205 The DCE could potentially represent “an 
active market with a sufficient quantity of reliable and verifiable data”, hence making this 
approach applicable in the ODR service. The third approach is the income approach, which 
would consider the predicted income stream for the right owner, taking into account risks 
and duration of the income.206 For the DCE’s ODR service, the second approach would 
probably be easiest to achieve, as information on past transactions could be stored in a 
                                                
200 Carneiro (2011) p.47. 
201 In the case of unauthorised exploitation of a work, market price is considered the starting point for the 
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203 Parr (2005) p.148. 
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knowledge base ready for retrieval. Information needed for the two other approaches would 
have to be gathered from external sources, before becoming a part of the knowledge base 
of the DCE. 
 
In the case of Kristoffer and Kari, the system generated a price range for a film trailer li-
cence. The licensor was satisfied with this price range as it was based on the prices he and 
other licensors had sold licences for film trailers on the DCE. However, he offered to settle 
on a price 40% off market price as he acknowledged unclear terms on his behalf. Kristoffer 
and Kari thought, with knowledge of their BATNA and WATNA, this was an acceptable 
solution and the dispute was resolved.  
5.3.1.2.3 Bargaining Chips 
Where non-pecuniary interests are at stake, a further useful tool for users could be bargain-
ing chips. Recalling from section 5.2.3, Marte got in trouble for using a modified photo for 
an advertising campaign and was invited to the ODR process. Marte hoped she could get 
away with paying a sum of money. However, the photographer, Anne, who had a clear 
health and fitness profile on her work, was not happy with seeing her photo in a deep-fried 
Mars bar advertisement. Therefore only receiving a sum of money was not an acceptable 
solution for Anne. Still, she had problems with formulating what would make her satisfied 
and kept saying that Marte should not have used the photo for the advertisement campaign. 
The ODR system detected that non-pecuniary interests were at stake and suggested the bar-
gain chips tool. This tool, through asking the parties questions, identifies what is important 
to the parties207 and gives examples of options upon which the parties could reach an 
agreement – this could include a formal public or private apology, author acknowledge-
ment or a undertaking on the part of the infringing party not to use the copyright infringing 
material in the future for a particular purpose. Coming back to the example, Marte’s adver-
tisement campaign was running in the UK, where deep-fried Mars bars is well-known, but 
also as a smaller introductory campaign in Norway. Anne, who exclusively operated in the 
                                                
207 See further Van Veenen (2010a) pp.9-10. 
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Norwegian market, was most worried about this side of the campaign. The ODR system 
suggested to focus on limitation of territory. Along with a sum of money, this was some-
thing Anne could be satisfied with and Marte was willing to stop the (anyway hopeless) 
campaign in Norway. 
5.3.1.3 All Automatic 
The above discussions mostly focused on manual users of the ODR. It could be proposed 
that for some disputes, where speed is particularly important, parties could be represented 
by software agents so settlement would happen without any interference by humans. If im-
plemented successfully, this would result in significant savings in time, and therefore mon-
ey, for the relevant users of the DCE. One example of users that could benefit from this is 
large-scale licensees, such as MyNews. For companies purchasing hundreds or thousands 
of licences every day, it is likely that, for example, some of the content could be damaged 
or not completed by delivery. When noticed by the automatic agent undertaking the licens-
ing procedure, the issue would be brought to the ODR service where the automatic agent, 
prepared with information from the user, would go through the procedure in question. Set-
tlement would be chosen if beneficial, compensation received or/and another version of the 
broken content could be acquired without any inconvenience for the users. Not only big 
businesses would benefit from such procedure but the typical consumer may also find such 
a process convenient. Especially when coming to minor issues, the convenience would be 
more important than having direct personal control over the decisions made in a dispute. 
However, in many disputes this level of automatisation may not be desired, as the dispu-
tants might want to be personally involved in all decisions, and therefore, this aspect of 
ODR should be optional.  
5.3.2 Human intervention 
Section 5.3.1 above considered the role of software-based negotiation in the ODR. Alt-
hough dispute resolution can be run by software to a great degree it is suggested that there 
is a role for a human mediator in the ODR process. Due to the variety of disputes possible 
as shown in section 5.2, meeting all the needs with technology would be difficult, if not 
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impossible.208 Therefore, the mediator can take over where the technology stops and pro-
vide the appropriate service to users.  
 
Furthermore, some users may, for various reasons, be more comfortable communicating 
with a human mediator rather than a computer. In addition, a human mediator could miti-
gate frustration of the users. There could be situations where the system does not respond 
to the information given or choices taken in any ‘reasonable’ way – we have all been in the 
situation where we try to explain something to an artificial voice on an automatic phone 
service line without success. For these reasons, the option of human mediation should al-
ways be available for the ODR user. In any case, the human mediator would benefit from 
the technology as well, for example, by using the software support tools. Furthermore, the 
system could provide the mediator with information about the foregoing circumstances of 
the dispute to enable them to assist the parties in reaching an agreement. 
 
One particular disadvantage of using human mediators is the running cost involved. In con-
trast, automation would, after the up-front design costs, be practically free. Although fund-
ing is not within the scope of this thesis, in order to be attractive for the user, the ODR 
should be as cheap as possible. It could therefore be suggested that, if necessary to add a 
fee for using the ODR, a cost should only be attached to the human mediator service. How-
ever, the cost should not be high, in order to meet the needs of as many users as possible. 
5.4 Advantages of ODR  
5.4.1 Cost 
As can be seen from the foregoing sections, there are many advantages for the user of the 
ODR service in the DCE. It would be a cheap alternative to both formal judicial proceed-
ings and traditional ADR – even where a fee would be charged for the human meditator 
option.209 There is no need for the cost and time involved in, for example, travelling, meet-
                                                
208 See the feasibility of legal AI-systems considered in Schafer (2010). 
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ings210 and for cross-border disputes the complex jurisdiction question is avoided.211 In 
particular, the potentially large cost of raising or defending a court action is avoided. It is 
likely that many of the disputes on the DCE would be low-value and a cheap procedure 
would therefore enable resolution in situations where the costs of other methods of dispute 
resolution would be disproportionate to the interests at stake. 
5.4.2 Speed  
Many of the software tools described above would increase the speed at which disputes 
could be settled or agreements could be made and the delays involved in traditional dispute 
resolution methods would be circumvented. The user could use the service from their home 
computer and therefore the ODR would be at their service at the click of a key. For the user 
who employs the all-automatic service, their involvement in the process would be minimal, 
making resolving the dispute incredibly quick and convenient.   
5.4.3 Flexibility 
The contract formation side of the ODR adds flexibility to the DCE process and enables 
deals to take place that are better for both parties than the standard licensing procedure. 
Regarding dispute resolution, the fact that there is no meeting at a specific time allows the 
parties to engage with the resolution process whenever they want. This also means the us-
ers have time to consider their decisions and can receive advice from others. If the DCE 
operated in an international environment, this added flexibility could prove important due 
to the number of time-zones involved.    
5.4.4 Control 
The ODR service gives a sense of control for both parties over the licence agreement, and 
this is perhaps particularly important for the licensor who gets an extra tool to remain in 
control of her work, even when it comes to low value transactions. The procedure is also in 
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control of the parties as it would be voluntary and they can always decide which direction 
the negotiations take.  
5.4.5 Reducing Risk 
The contract formation feature could reduce risk for under-negotiated agreements, where, 
for example, the licensee takes the chance to accept a licence assuming that it covers what 
she needs without being sure, which could lead to a dispute. Furthermore, the dispute reso-
lution feature would be an alternative to, hence reduce the risk for, litigation.  
5.4.6 Moral rights 
Some licensors may have particular moral rights concerns regarding the use of their work. 
The contract formation side of the ODR would enable them to go into detail and discuss 
this with the licensee. The dispute resolution side of the ODR also makes enforcement of 
moral rights easier.  
5.4.7 Trust  
Finally, having an ODR service could add trust to the DCE system, as users would know 
about the easy and cheap way of resolving any disputes. If a user has been through a satis-
factory dispute resolution process, this could increase customer loyalty. In the end this 
could lead growth in the number of the users of the DCE in general.  
5.5 Challenges of ODR 
5.5.1 Lack of Face to Face Communication 
One of the main challenges or drawbacks of ODR is considered to be the lack of face-to-
face communication, which is said to be “probably the richest of all communications en-
counters”212 where just the slightest change of voice or use of body language can change 
the meaning of words.213 However, in many of the disputes on the DCE, a face-to-face 
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meeting would not be possible (due to travel costs or distance), in these cases ODR is not a 
substitute214 but a new opportunity for resolving disputes and would allow people involved 
in low-value disputes215.  
 
In other cases face-to-face meetings could even impede settlement of a dispute, for exam-
ple, where there are emotional tensions between the parties216 or significant power imbal-
ance.217 This situation could occur on the DCE if a big company has infringed the moral 
rights of an independent self-distributing author and in a face-to-face meeting the former 
would have a different level of experience in settling disputes in their favour. Such experi-
ence could also be beneficial online, but the ODR process would be less emotionally 
charged and allows parties more time to consider their alternatives. Further, the ODR pro-
cedure can be seen as a continuous on-going progress towards resolution and thereby al-
lowing a quicker settlement because there is no delay between face-to-face meetings which 
can hinder settlement.218 
5.5.2 Deception 
Another concern is the difficulties of dealing with fraud. Although deception occurs in any 
dispute resolution system,219 it could potentially be increased when there is no human in-
teraction,220 and if there were a user of the ODR with false identity it could be difficult to 
discover the user’s true identity.221 As the proposed ODR would deal with disputes origi-
nating from the DCE, this problem could be partly remedied by having secure identifica-
tion processes when registering as a DCE user and when purchasing licences, although this 
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should not affect the user-friendliness of the DCE. However, the DCE is based on voluntar-
iness and so is the ODR, therefore, it is expected that the users of the DCE want to trade 
legally and not infringe copyright. As a result, intentional deception is less likely to occur.  
6 Conclusion 
The picture painted in the introduction of this thesis was one of the juxtaposition between a 
thriving life of trade and culture provided for by the Internet and a broken copyright regime 
where futile attempts where being made to bring online copyright infringement to an end. 
Providing the ideal online space for creativity whilst also protecting legal rights to the con-
tent published on the Internet is incredibly difficult. In the Norwegian legal system “the 
importance of balancing copyright and avoiding repression of other societal interests has 
traditionally been greatly emphasised.”222 This balance has also been emphasised through-
out this thesis. Now, this balance is under threat. The strong focus over the recent years on 
expanding the scope of copyright protection, together with the simplification of traditional 
enforcement, could arguably tip the scales in favour of the right owner with the conse-
quence that public access to culture and knowledge would suffer. 
 
To address this problem, inspired by the suggestion in the Hargreaves Report, this thesis 
has argued for the introduction of a Digital Copyright Exchange that could both increase 
access to creative content as well as protect copyright, with the aim of reducing copyright 
infringement. It was further argued that it would be beneficial to introduce the DCE in 
Norway. Based on an examination of the reasons underlying copyright infringement online 
in section 3.2, it was argued that traditional approaches to the problem have been largely 
ineffective and that a holistic approach was required. The proposed DCE is put forward as 
such a holistic approach. The aforementioned examination further showed that access, 
price, safety and simplicity were of importance for the three identified categories of copy-
right infringers, namely i) consumers, ii) re-users and iii) distributors. These factors then 
informed the shaping of the DCE where user-friendliness and functionality were considered 
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paramount. To encourage acceptance of the DCE and cater for the varying needs of users, it 
was proposed to have one main procedure for regular users, where simplicity is the main 
focus, together with exception handling for those users who deviated from the norm by 
including the ODR feature for i) contract formation and ii) dispute resolution. Online dis-
pute resolution was not discussed by the Hargreaves Report but as ODR could greatly add 
value to DCE, this has been discussed at length in this thesis. As can be seen from the 
above analysis, there are many advantages of ODR in the context of the DCE as the provi-
sion of a such a service would allow a quick, flexible and cheap method of resolving dis-
putes or forming contracts while also building user loyalty.  
 
The ODR service would have a particularly helpful role in relation to moral rights. In de-
signing the DCE in this thesis, I took account of the fact that the protected interests in Har-
greaves’ version of the DCE was based on a Common Law copyright rationale and did not 
include discussion of moral rights. As moral rights represent important interests in Norwe-
gian copyright law, the treatment of moral rights would be significant to the feasibility of 
the DCE in Norway.  
 
The analysis in section 4 shows how the DCE as envisaged in this thesis could neutralise 
the reasons for copyright infringement by providing to the user a preferable substitute for 
the illegal market. It is ambitious, and perhaps quite naïve, but on the basis of this analysis, 
it could be argued that there is a good prima facie case for the DCE. There is still need for 
progressive thinking in the field of copyright infringement and this thesis attempts to con-
tribute to such thinking. Before a functioning DCE could be introduced, much interdisci-
plinary research and empirical testing, both technological and juridical, would need to be 
completed. However, based on the premises of this thesis it can be concluded, and recom-
mended, that a DCE be introduced in Norway.  
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